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On October 15, 1965, Peter Wolff and Richard Shortt, two New
Yorkers attending the University of Michigan, participated in a dem-
onstration opposing American policy in Vietnam. The demonstration
took place at the offices of the local Selective Service Board in Ann
Arbor. Subsequently, each was reclassified from II-S to I-A by his local
board, acting at the request of the New York City Director of Selective
Service. Wolff and Shortt sought relief in federal court, alleging that
the local boards had "acted wholly without jurisdiction and in viola-
tion of their First Amendment rights of free speech and assembly,"
and asking for an order directing the return of their student defer-
ments. The district court dismissed for lack of a justiciable contro-
versy.'
In holding that the claims were premature, the court apparently
relied upon Estep v. United States,2 where the Supreme Court held
that no judicial review of a classification by the Selective Service Sys-
tem was possible unless the claimant had exhausted all his administra-
tive remedies under the System and had precipitated an indictment by
refusing to be inducted into the military. The registrant could then
assert misclassification as a defense in the district court if he could
show that there was "no basis in fact" for the classification. 4 On appeal,
I See Wolff v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 16, 372 F.2d 817, 820 (2d Cir. 1967).
2 327 U.S. 114 (1946).
3 Military Selective Service Act of 1967, § 12(a), 62 Stat. 622 (1948), 50 U.S.C.A.
Appendix § 462(a) (Supp. 1967), provides for indictment, inter alia, of
any person who . . . evades or refuses registration or service in the armed
forces ... or who knowingly counsels, aids, or abets another to refuse or evade
registration or service... or who... shall knowingly fail or neglect or refuse to
perform any duty required of him under . . . this title . . . or . . . who shall
knowingly hinder or interfere . . . with the administration of this title . . .
shall . . . be punished by imprisonment for not more than five years or a fine
of not more than $10,000, or by both such fine and imprisonment ....
4 Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 122-23 (1946). Section 10(b)(3) of the Military
Selective Service Act of 1967 states that, subject to the appeals procedure authorized by
the act and the rules and regulations of the President, the "decision of [a] local board
shall be final .... " 81 Stat. 104, 50 U.S.C.A. Appendix § 460(b)(3) (Supp. 1967). Until
recently, no statute permitting judicial review of the administrative acts of the system
916
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the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that the case
presented an exception to the Estep rule. The local board had acted
outside its jurisdiction,5 clearly intending to "punish" the plaintiffs
for their protest. The court held that the board's action constituted a
denial of the plaintiffs' first amendment rights and thus presented a
justiciable controversy without resort to the Estep tests. 6 In one stroke,
the Second Circuit expanded the scope of judicial review over the
Selective Service far beyond the narrow Estep doctrine. Nevertheless,
it remanded the case for determination of whether the plaintiffs could
establish an amount in controversy sufficient for federal jurisdiction.7
It seems unwise to require a showing of proper jurisdictional
amount when injunctive relief is sought to protect constitutional rights
from infringement. But the federal courts are courts of limited
had ever been enacted. Estep thus created a judicial exception to the statutory language.
Estep was a Jehovah's Witness who claimed to be a minister and therefore entitled to a
IV-D classification. After exhausting his administrative appeals, he refused to be inducted
and was indicted under what is now § 12(a) of the Military Selective Service Act of
1967, 50 U.S.C.A. Appendix § 462(a) (Supp. 1967). Since a question of personal liberty
was involved, the Supreme Court found that it could not
readily infer that Congress departed so far from the traditional concepts of a
fair trial when it made the actions of the local boards "final" as to provide that
a citizen of this country should go to jail for not obeying an unawful order of
an administrative agency.
327 U.S. at 122. After more than 20 years, the Estep doctrine has finally received con-
gressional sanction. Military Selective Service Act of 1967, § 10(b)(3), 50 U.S.C.A. Appendix
§ 460(b)(3) (Supp. 1967).
The Estep doctrine is more fully explored in the literature on the courts and the
Selective Service. See, e.g., Note, Military Service-Judicial Review of Draft Classification,
34 N.C.L. Rav. 375, 380 (1956); Note, Fairness and Due Process Under the Selective
Service System, 114 U. PA. L. Rxv. 1014, 1015-19 (1966); Note, Judicial Review of Draft
Board Orders, 10 Wyo. L. Rxv. 208, 210-11 (1956). With respect to the operation of the
Selective Service, see Note, The Selective Service, 76 YALE L.J. 160 (1966).
G Wolff v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 16, 372 F.2d 817, 822 (2d Cir. 1967). The
court reasoned that a local board can only reclassify a registrant as a delinquent if he
balks at his own service. The criminal provisions of § 12(a) of the Military Selective
Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C.A. Appendix § 462(a) (Supp. 1967), are directed at anyone
who interferes with the operation of the Selective Service, and encompass general inter-
ference as well as interference with one's own service. But jurisdiction for the criminal
action under § 12(a) lies in the district court alone. Since Wolff and Shortt did not
interfere with their own service, but rather picketed another local board, their action
was, if anything, a criminal violation under § 12(a), not a violation that would allow
their local boards to reclassify them as I-A delinquents.
6 372 F.2d at 824. The court also found the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies inapplicable, since plaintiffs are not required to pursue all possible administra-
tive remedies before resorting to judicial action "where there is nothing to be gained"
from such a pursuit. Id. at 825. With respect to the substantive holdings of the case, see
31 ALBANY L. Rav. 349 (1967); 13 WAYNE L. Rnv. 722 (1967); 81 HARv. L. Rav. 685 (1968).
7 372 F.2d at 826.
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jurisdiction, deriving their power from acts of Congress," and a plain-
tiff seeking to enter a federal forum must fit his claim within some
congressional grant of authority.9 Section 1331 of the Judicial Code
provides that claims arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties
of the United States are cognizable only if the matter in controversy
exceeds $10,000.10 The monetary limitation has been strictly construed,
and even federal equity jurisdiction, which is frequently invoked
because the potential damage is difficult to evaluate, depends upon the
presence of "money, or some right the value of which can be estimated
and ascertained in money, and which appears by the record to be of the
requisite pecuniary value."" Although suits involving nonmonetary
claims have caused difficulty, the Supreme Court, in several landmark
decisions (none of which have involved civil rights), has indicated that
valuation is both possible and necessary. 12 Moreover, two members of
the majority in Hague v. CIO1 3 stated that the valuation requirement
of section 1331 also applied to claims involving the alleged violation
of first amendment rights.14
8 Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 376 (1940);
Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 233-34 (1922).
9 Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 188 (1943).
10 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1964) provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive
of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States.
11 South Carolina v. Seymour, 153 U.S. 353, 357 (1894) (discussing an earlier juris-
dictional statute that required a jurisdictional amount). Accord, Barry v. Mercein, 46
U.S. (5 How.) 103, 120 (1847); McGuire v. Amrein, 101 F. Supp. 414, 418 (D. Md. 1951);
Collins v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 129 F. Supp. 722, 726 (W.D. Mo. 1955) (dictum).
12 KVOS, Inc. v. Associated Press, 299 U.S. 269, 277-79 (1936); McNutt v. General
Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 181-82 (1936); Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 268-70
(1934). With respect to the evaluation of damages in nonmonetary suits involving alleged
damage to economic interest generally, see Comment, Federal Jurisdiction: Amount in
Controversy in Suits for Nonmonetary Remedies, 46 CALF. L. Rav. 601 (1958); Note,
Federal Jurisdictional Amount: Determination of the Matter in Controversy, 73 HAv. L.
REv. 1369 (1960); Note, Federal Jurisdictional Amount Requirement in Injunction Suits,
49 YALE L.J. 274 (1939).
1' 807 U.S. 496, 507-08 (1939).
14 In Hague, however, jurisdiction was found under another section of the Judicial
Code (the predecessor to 28 U.S.C. § 1843(3) (1964)), which grants jurisdiction without
matter in controversy where "state action" threatens federal rights. See note 16 infra.
In cases such as Wolff, the problem involved is the deprivation of federal rights by
federal action.
In the Hague case, the plaintiff labor organizers were expelled from Jersey City, New
Jersey, pursuant to a local anti-leafleting ordinance, which they alleged violated their
first amendment rights. Seven Supreme Court Justices heard the case. Announcing the
Court's decision, Justices Roberts and Black found no federal jurisdiction under the
predecessor to § 1331, because plaintiffs failed to show the value of the rights infringed,
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The $10,000 requirement in federal question cases has been cir-
cumscribed by many statutory exceptions.15 One section of the Judicial
Code provides civil rights jurisdiction regardless of amount in contro-
versy, but only in cases of deprivation of federal rights by persons
acting under color of state law. 16 Another section provides for man-
damus jurisdiction in the district courts,17 but mandamus is not avail-
able to compel an officer to perform a discretionary act.' 8 Since classifi-
although, as noted above, jurisdiction was found under the predecessor to § 1343(3). 307
U.S. at 507-08, 512-13. Relief was granted on the ground that the type of activity engaged
in by petitioners constituted free speech protected under the privileges and immunities
clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Two other Justices, Stone and Reed, preferred to rely upon the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment as the basis for protecting this type of free speech, id. at
519, but agreed that § 1331 should not preclude jurisdiction under § 1343(3). Id. at 529-30.
The broad statement in Hague that no matter in controversy is required for civil rights
claims is confined to claims within the latter section; for others, e.g., suits for depriva-
tion of federal rights under color of federal law, it cannot be supported. This was
clarified in a subsequent opinion by Justice Stone, holding that § 1343(3) provides
jurisdiction over suits brought under the Civil Rights Act, i.e., suits for deprivation of
federal rights under the color of state law. Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157,
161 (1943). Other courts have cited the Hague opinion in speaking broadly of the
"invaluable" character of civil rights, e.g., Jordan v. Hutcheson, 323 F.2d 597, 599, 601
(4th Cir. 1963), but always in the context of state action. At least one court appears to
have realized that the Hague holding concerning matter in controversy dealt only with
state action cases. See Fischler v. McCarthy, 117 F. Supp. 643, 647 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd per
curiam, 218 F.2d 164 (2d Cir. 1954) (action against "federal official" must comply with
§ 1331).
15 E.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1336 (Interstate Commerce Commission orders), 1337 (commerce
and antitrust regulations), 1338 (patents, copyrights, trademarks, and unfair competition),
1339 (postal matters). Jurisdictional statutes are occasionally scattered elsewhere through-
out the United States Code. See, e.g., INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7402(c), which provides
jurisdiction for suits by internal revenue officers for injury sustained while acting within
the scope of their duties.
16 The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized
by law to be commenced by any person...
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordi-
nance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured
by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing
for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States ....
28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1964).
17 "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature
of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof
to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff." 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1964).
18 Under the classical mandamus theory, an act is "ministerial" when the officer is
bound to perform it. It is "discretionary" when the officer is vested with authority to
decide whether or not to perform it. Mandamus lies to compel an officer to perform an
act of the former variety. This distinction was made as long ago as Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 170-71 (1803), and reiterated in Wilbur v. United States ex rel.
Kadrie, 281 U.S. 206, 218-19 (1930). The cases that grant mandamus involve forcing the
1968]
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cation is at the discretion of the local board, mandamus would not lie
to order reclassification. 19
These exceptions and others have narrowed the zone of the section
1331 requirement of jurisdictional amount, so that:
The only significant classes of federal-question cases in which
the presence of a jurisdictional amount is required are cases in-
volving constitutionality of state statutes; cases based on the Jones
Act ... and cases against federal officers for alleged infringement
of federal constitutional rights.20
The actions by Wolff and Shortt clearly fall within the last category.
Giancana v. Johnson2' presented a similar controversy. Suit was brought
for an injunction against the FBI on the ground that its continuous
and harassing surveillance invaded the plaintiff's right of privacy, as
protected by the fourth and fifth amendments. The plaintiff argued
that he need not allege an amount in controversy, since the rights
involved were "priceless." The Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff
must value his rights, and dismissed the complaint for failure to
allege the jurisdictional amount22
It should be pointed out, however, that although "suits against
federal officers" covers a large area, the $10,000 requirement is oper-
defendant to perform some clerical or administrative duty within the scope of his
authority, such as compelling the delivery of a writ or the payment of a pension. On the
other hand, an officer might act outside the scope of his authority, abusing his discretion
and injuring a plaintiff. Again, as long ago as Marbury, the courts realized that redress
could be provided for such an unlawful act. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 170. The applicable
relief, however, would in all likelihood be injunctive. See, e.g., Bell v. Hood, 71 F. Supp.
813, 819 (S.D. Cal. 1947), on remand from 327 U.S. 678 (1946), where this distinction is
made. It would seem that § 1861 deals with the former situation, the legal writ of
mandamus, and not with the latter, equitable injunction, for which § 1881 may be the
only provision.
The rationale for the distinction appears to be that judicial interference with dis-
cretionary acts of an executive officer may violate the constitutional concept of separation
of powers. On the other hand, a ministerial act is a duty owed by the executive to the
petitioner, and courts may interfere to protect the petitioner's rights.
19 The courts have confirmed that mandamus will not lie against the Selective
Service. See United States v. Mancuso, 189 F.2d 90, 91 (3d Cir. 1948). Although mandamus
would not be available in Wolff, reclassification was there employed by the Board as a
weapon, so it was possible to seek an injunction to protect constitutional rights.
20 Note, Federal Jurisdictional Amount: Determination of the Matter in Contro-
versy, 73 HARv. L. Rv. 1869, 1378 n.58 (1960) (citations omitted).
21 335 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 1001 (1965).
22 Id. at 368-69. Other cases in which either lack of or failure to allege the juris-
dictional amount has proven fatal are Jackson v. Kuhn, 254 F.2d 555, 560 (8th Cir. 1958)
(suit to enjoin Army from policing Little Rock schools), and Fischler v. McCarthy, 117
F. Supp. 643, 647 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd per curiam, 218 F.2d 164 (2d Cir. 1954) (suit to enjoin
production of records at Senate hearing).
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ative in a much narrower sector. Judicial review of the action of many
administrative agencies is permitted without regard to matter in con-
troversy once all administrative remedies have been exhausted. For
example, the statutes creating the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, the National Labor Relations Board, the Federal Communica-
tions Commission, and all those agencies that operate under the review
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act 23 provide for judicial
review of agency action.24 Other agencies, however, have no such pro-
vision. The Selective Service Act provides that decisions reached by
the System at the conclusion of the administrative processes are "final,' 25
and almost no judicial review is permitted.26 The Supreme Court has
never held such limitations unconstitutional. 7 If a plaintiff claims that
his rights have been infringed by an officer of an agency that lacks a
judicial review provision, such as the Selective Service System, he must
be able to demonstrate an appropriate "matter in controversy" or his
claim will fail.
There are three alternative means of extricating plaintiffs from
the dilemma of having to value priceless rights: (1) liberal federal
court interpretation of what facts are sufficient to meet the require-
ment of "matter in controversy," (2) state court action to enjoin federal
officials where the requisite jurisdictional amount cannot be shown,
and (3) possible amendment of the jurisdictional statutes to allow these
claims without an allegation of jurisdictional amount.
23 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (Supp. II 1966).
24 E.g., Securities Act of 1933, § 9, 15 U.S.C. § 77i (1964) (Securities and Exchange
Commission); Labor Management Relations Act, § 10(f), 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1964)
(National Labor Relations Board); Communications Act of 1934, § 402, 47 U.S.C. § 402
(1964) (Federal Communications Commission).
25 Military Selective Service Act of 1967, § 10(b)(3), 81 Stat. 104, 50 U.S.C.A. Appendix
§ 460(b)(3) (Supp. 1967), provides in pertinent part: "The decisions of such local board
shall be final, except where an [administrative] appeal is authorized and is taken in
accordance with such rules and regulations as the President may prescribe."
26 The scope of review was expanded by Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946),
and the result has recently been codified. See note 4 supra. Statutory language making
administrative action "unreviewable" or "final" raises complex problems in administra-
tive law, beyond the scope of this Note. It should be pointed out, however, that even when
a court occasionally circumvents a statutory mandate of finality, full judicial review does
not necessarily become available. For instance, contrast the "review" permitted under
the Estep doctrine with that permissible under the judicial review procedure authorized in
Title 5 of the United States Code. When a court expands the statutory scope of review,
it does so only in a very limited way, and only for the most compelling reasons.
27 "[Tjhe plain fact remains that the Supreme Court has never held that denial of
a limited review is a denial of due process of law." 4 K. DAvis, ADMINIsATnv LAw § 28.19,
at 106 (1958).
1968]
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II
AVOIDING THE PROBLEM: PROOF OF JURISDICTIONAL
AMOUNT UNDER SECTION 1331
In some cases plaintiffs have succeeded in "valuing" their consti-
tutional rights. 28 No case has held that these rights are incapable of
evaluation. The complaint in Giancana v. Johnson29 was dismissed for
failure to allege the jurisdictional amount. In Wolff3° the court merely
remanded for a showing of the required sum. Some plaintiffs have
based their claims upon the actual economic harm resulting from vio-
lation of civil rights. For example, in Gobitis v. Minersville School
District,31 the plaintiff alleged as a matter in controversy the cost of
sending his children to a private school after their expulsion from pub-
lic school for refusing, on religious principles, to salute the flag. Other
plaintiffs have successfully alleged tort-like damages, i.e., recovery for
noneconomic harm designed to make the plaintiff whole. In Wiley v.
Sinkler,32 for example, the Court stated that damages could be awarded
for deprivation by election officials of the plaintiff's right to vote.33
Case law seems to support an analogy between claims of civil rights
violations and simple tort cases. The Supreme Court in Hague spoke
of "tortious invasions of alleged civil rights, '34 and the district court
in Bell v. Hood3 5 pointed out that the Bill of Rights stemmed from
a desire to protect the citizenry from what were essentially tortious
actions at common law.36 Thus, a federal court may be expected to treat
28 See cases cited notes 31-33 infra.
29 335 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 879 U.S. 1001 (1965).
30 Wolff v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 16, 372 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1967).
31 24 F. Supp. 271, 275 (E.D. Pa. 1988). Gobitis is the famous flag-salute case,
reversed by the Supreme Court on constitutional rather than jurisdictional grounds.
Minersvile School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 600 (1940). The Supreme Court later
overruled itself on the constitutional issue. Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 819 U.S. 624, 642
(1943).
32 179 U.S. 58 (1900).
33 Id. at 64-65. The claim was dismissed, however, because the plaintiff failed to allege
that he was registered to vote. Other tort-like cases include Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475,
485 (1908) (Wiley v. Sinkler reaffirmed as to possibility of estimation of political and
social rights), and Hynes v. Briggs, 41 F. 468, 471 (E.D. Ark. 1890) (false imprisonment by
sheriff acting pursuant to illegal state statute). All these cases involved state action and
would now fall under § 1848(8). In each, however, a civil right was valuated.
84 Hague v. CIO, 807 U.S. 496, 507 (1989).
35 71 F. Supp. 818 (S.D. Cal. 1947), on remand from 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
386 The right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures is a common-law
right.... Thus the Fourth Amendment did not create a new right, but merely




civil rights claims, for jurisdictional amount purposes, in much the
same manner as it treats tort actions. And modern tort damages fre-
quently have an aura of speculation about them.
Damages for pain and suffering provide a clear example of the
speculative nature of tort damages. Although it may be clear that the
plaintiff has suffered some injury for which he should be recompensed,
the amount of damages is largely a matter of guesswork. Glaims for
invasion of privacy, defamation, and assault and battery all share this
quality. If analogous treatment is accorded to claims of those who suffer
deprivation of a constitutional privilege, the fact that the amount of
damage is unascertainable should not preclude successful allegations
of an amount in controversy. If physical and psychological damage can
be translated into dollar amounts with sufficient certainty to meet the
$10,000 jurisdictional minimum, intangible damage to one's civil rights
should be similarly translatable. That the claim "must be money, or
some right the value of which can be . . . ascertained in money"8 7
should not require an economic loss shown with absolute certainty.
Using the analogy of civil rights claims to tort claims, plaintiffs
such as Wolff and Giancana arguably could assert valid claims that
would entitle them to a hearing for an injunction in the federal courts.
In Giancana's case, the claim could be predicated on the value to him
of his right to privacy. Wolff might base his claim on the fact that,
without immediate reclassification, he must run the risk of a criminal
trial in order to assert his first amendment rights. Since, to avoid dis-
missal on the ground that the jurisdictional amount is clearly lacking,
the plaintiffs must show only that it does not "appear to a legal certainty
that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount,"38 they
should be able to withstand such a motion by defendants. For dam-
ages to be insufficient to a "legal certainty," it must appear that, as a
matter of law, the plaintiff cannot recover the damages he claims.39
If the defendant's answer denies the jurisdictional amount, the
plaintiff is put to his proof in a summary hearing that may be under-
37 South Carolina v. Seymour, 153 U.S. 353, 357 (1894).
38 St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289 (1938) (emphasis
added). Accord, Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348, 353 (1961); Muller v.
Groban, 346 F.2d 263, 265 (7th Cir. 1965).
39 In Parmelee v. Ackerman, 252 F.2d 721 (6th Cir. 1958), a diversity-of-citizenship
case, the plaintiff claimed damages for unintentional mental anguish. Since recovery on
these grounds was not permitted under the applicable law (Ohio), and since without
this claim the alleged damages were below the jurisdictional requirement, it appeared
to a "legal certainty" that the requisite matter in controversy did not exist. Accordingly,
the court dismissed for want of jurisdiction. See also Trail v. Green, 206 F. Supp. 896, 900
(D.N.J. 1962).
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taken by affidavits. 40 If the required proof were strict, many plaintiffs
might not succeed. But in the summary hearing there is no need to
prove the precise damages claimed in cases where the nature of the
right infringed makes such precision difficult.41 Indeed, the plaintiffs
themselves are not required to know the exact value.42 Rather, if the
plaintiff can show a "good faith" claim not stated solely for jurisdic-
tional purposes, it should be sustained.43 Although "good faith" has
been variously defined, one court has summed up the law by stating:
The test is not so much the actual amount of the recovery that
might be had but whether, when the suit was brought, the plaintiff
may have been reasonably entitled to recover an amount in excess
of the jurisdictional requirement.44
If imprecision can be tolerated for cases involving pain and suffering,45
it can be tolerated for claims of deprivation of civil rights by federal
officers.46
40 See Lowe's, Inc. v. Martin, 10 F.R.D. 143, 145 (N.D. Ohio 1950).
41 Food Fair Stores, Inc v. Food Fair, Inc., 177 F.2d 177, 182 (1st Cir. 1949).
42 Loew's, Inc. v. Martin, 10 F.R.D. 143, 145 (N.D. Ohio 1950).
43 E.g., A.C. McKoy, Inc. v. Schonwald, 341 F.2d 737, 738 (10th Cir. 1965); Norwood
Lumber Corp. v. McKean, 153 F.2d 753, 754 (3d Cir. 1946). Actually, the "good faith"
and "legal certainty" tests are quite similar. One court said:
The end of clarity will be furthered ... if the first test [good faith] is seen to be
but a linguistic variant of the second [legal certainty], for, as one authority has
noted, "unless it appears to a legal certainty that plaintiff cannot recover the sum
for which he prays, how can it be held that his claim for that sum is not in good
faith?"
Deutsch v. Hewes St. Realty Corp., 359 F.2d 96, 99 (2d Cir. 1966), quoting C. W1aosrr,
FEDm ,L CouRTs § 33, at 95 (1963). For a discussion of other cases involving the "good
faith" rule, see Note, Good Faith Pleading of Jurisdictional Amount, 48 IowA L. REv.
426 (1963). See also Note, Determination of Federal jurisdictional Amount in Suits on
Unliquidated Claims, 64 MicI. L. Rzv. 930 (1966).
44 Odlivak v. Elliott, 82 F. Supp. 607, 610 (D. Del. 1949).
45 Cf. Cohen v. Proctor & Gamble Distrib. Co., 16 F.R.D. 128, 130-31 (D. Del. 1954).
46 The jurisdictional amount requirement poses a unique difficulty for the courts.
If the matter in controversy does not exceed $10,000, then logically no jurisdiction should
exist. Yet the determination of the actual amount of damages may involve a trial on the
merits. Both time-consuming sham allegations and dismissals of meritorious issues should
be avoided. The "legal certainty" test thus seems to strike a balance between the two
conflicting goals. Deutsch v. Hewes St. Realty Corp., 359 F.2d 96, 98-100 (2d Cir. 1966).
It is arguable that when there is a "genuine dispute . . . as to the applicable law in
determining the damages to be allowed," the plaintiff should be entitled to go to the jury.
Mulier v. Groban, 346 F.2d 263, 265 (7th Cir. 1965). This question on the merits should
not be determined on motion to the court. On the other hand, Congress has recoguized
the undesirability of a time-consuming trial on the merits, followed by a dismissal for
lack of jurisdictional amount. In 1958, in an attempt to cut down on blatantly exag-
gerated unliquidated claims, Congress established a penalty, to be used at the court's
discretion, where the damages actually awarded were below the jurisdictional sum: the
plaintiff could be required to bear the costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(b) (1964). Commentators
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But, although Wolff might successfully allege the jurisdictional
amount, the solution is far from ideal. It still requires placing a mone-
tary value on rights that should be guaranteed against infringement
regardless of the actual damage. Not every plaintiff will be able to
allege the jurisdictional sum in good faith. As Justice Stone recognized,
evaluation of civil rights damages is exceedingly difficult, and without
special jurisdictional statutes a "large proportion" of the actions would
not be maintainable.47 The federal courts are not likely to attempt a
more liberal interpretation of "matter in controversy" for civil rights
purposes. Rather, they view themselves as creatures of the statutes that
grant their jurisdiction, and are unwilling to extend their jurisdiction
beyond the statutory limitations.48
Furthermore, the federal courts themselves undoubtedly support
the congressional objective of keeping petty suits out of federal courts.49
And even though a desire to prevent injustice in civil rights suits might
tempt the courts to ease the requirements, they must recognize the
implications of such action. Increased pressure to relax the require-
ments in all cases would doubtless ensue. Moreover, disregarding the
mandate of a jurisdictional statute might threaten the principles of
separation of powers and federalism. 0
The courts should therefore not be expected to grant any special
consideration to civil rights cases brought under section 1331. Yet, with-
out special treatment, many civil rights claims could not be brought,
because sufficient consequential damages could not in good faith be
entertain serious doubts as to the propriety and workability of the measure. See, e.g.,
Cowen, Federal Jurisdiction Amended, 44 VA. L. Rnv. 971, 975-78 (1958).
47 Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 530 (1939).
48 See, e.g., Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108 (1941); Healy v.
Ratta, 292 US. 263, 270 (1934); Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 245 (1845).
49 The desire to cut down the workload of the federal courts by raising the jurisdic-
tional amount to exclude "petty suits" seems to have been the major, if not the only,
reason behind the 1958 increase from $3,000 to $10,000. Act of July 25, 1958, 72 Stat. 415,
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (a)(1964). See 58 COLUm. L. REv. 1287, 1289-91 (1958).
50 For a separation of powers argument, see, e.g., Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.)
236, 245 (1845), where the Court stated:
To deny this position (that Congress may set the jurisdiction of the inferior
federal courts] would be to elevate the judicial over the legislative branch of the
government, and to give to the former powers limited by its own discretion
merely. It follows, then, that the courts created by statute must look to the
statute as the warrant for their authority; certainly they cannot go beyond the
statute, and assert an authority with which they may not be invested by it, or
which may be clearly denied to them.
For a federalism argument, see, e.g., Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934), where it is
stated: "fDue regard for the rightful independence of state governments . . . requires
that (federal courts] scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits
which the statute has defined."
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alleged. The anomaly of requiring an allegation of monetary damages
for a civil rights claim remains. Section 1343 of the Judicial Code pro-
tects persons against the dilemma where state action is involved; similar
protection is needed where federal action violates an individual's civil
rights.
Since federal court initiative in relaxing the jurisdictional amount
requirement is both unlikely and undesirable, the remaining alterna-
tives of state court action and a new statutory remedy must be examined.
III
STATE COURT INJUNCTIONS
In theory, federal and state courts have "concurrent" jurisdiction
in federal question cases,51 but during the last century the theory has
broken down where claims are brought against federal officers. It is
clear that state courts can prosecute federal officials for criminal be-
havior that violates state law. It is equally clear that state courts lack
the power of mandamus over federal officers.52 State courts may enter a
money judgment against federal officials for wrongful action outside
the scope of their authority,53 but their power to enjoin such wrongful
action is doubtful.54
A line of New York cases has culminated in a holding that state
courts do not have the power to enjoin federal officials.55 Federal courts
have followed the same reasoning in cases removed to a federal forum
by the federal officer.56 In these cases, removal has been followed by
dismissal in the federal court on the ground that the state court was
originally without jurisdiction, and that the federal court therefore
lacked derivative jurisdiction. The Supreme Court, in Brooks v. De-
51 See In re Green River Drainage Area, 147 F. Supp. 127, 134 (D. Utah 1956). See
also Culison, State Courts, State Law, and Concurrent Jurisdiction of Federal Questions,
48 IowA L REv. 230 (1963).
52 Arnold, The Power of State Courts To Enjoin Federal Officers, 73 YALE L.J.
1385, 1391-93 (1964).
53 Teal v. Felton, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 284, 292 (1851). Accord, Leroux V. Hudson, 109
U.S. 468, 476-77 (1888).
54 See Arnold, supra note 52, at 1397; Note, Limitations on State Judicial Interference
with Federal Activities, 51 COLUM. L. REv. 84, 91-93 (1951). For the distinction between
mandamus and injunction, see note 18 supra.
55 Wasservogel v. Meyerowitz, 300 N.Y. 125, 133-34, 89 N.E.2d 712, 716-17 (1949);
Armand Schmoll, Inc. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 286 N.Y. 503, 508-09, 37 N.E.2d 225, 226-27
(1941); Fox v. 34 Hillside Realty Corp., 87 N.Y.S.2d 351, 352-53 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
56 See, e.g., Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n v. McGinnes, 179 F. Supp. 578, 582-83
(E.D. Pa, 1959), aff'd per curiam, 278 F.2d 330 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 820 (1960);
cases cited and discussed in Arnold, supra note 52, at 1393-94.
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war,57 declined to answer the question. State court injunctions thus
appear to be an uncertain remedy at best.
At stake in state court actions against federal officers is the power
of the federal government to act within its sphere, free of state inter-
ference. The supremacy clause of the Constitution, 8 and the corollary
that "the activities of the federal government are free from regulation
by any state,"59 effectively insulate federal officers from control by the
states.6 0
Some authors have argued that state courts should be granted the
power of injunction over federal officials."1 Since state and federal
jurisdiction is theoretically "concurrent," state courts should be per-
mitted to act in all federal question cases where exclusive jurisdiction
has not been given to the federal courts by statute. 2 Accordingly, state
courts should have the power to issue injunctions against infringement
of civil rights by federal officials. It has also been urged that withhold-
ing injunctive power from the state courts is not essential to protect
federal officials, since the available defenses, such as sovereign im-
munity, provide adequate protection.6 3 Moreover, since monetary
damages may be as obstructive as an injunction, the latter should be
available in state courts on the same terms as is the former.6 4 Nor
should it be assumed that state courts are so disloyal and disruptive
that they will use civil rights suits brought by individuals as a guise for
a campaign to obstruct and interfere with the federal government.6 5
57 313 U.S. 354, 359-60 (1941).
58 U.S. CONsT. art. VI, § 2, provides in pertinent part that the Constitution, laws, and
treaties of the United States are "the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding."
59 Mayo v. United States, 319 US. 441, 445 (1943).
60 See, e.g., Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 263 (1879); Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 397, 409 (1871). The distinctions mentioned above, e.g., allowing criminal prosecu-
tions but forbidding habeas corpus, become more understandable in this context. Habeas
corpus clearly interferes with the control of the federal government over its prisoners,
whereas a federal officer committing a criminal act is clearly acting beyond the scope of
his authority.
61 See Arnold, The Power of State Courts To Enjoin Federal Officers, 73 YAr.z L.J.
1385 (1964); Note, Limitations on State Judicial Interference with Federal Activities, 51
COLUm. L. Rnv. 84, 91-94 (1951); 34 GEo. WASH. L. R1v. 171, 176-78 (1966).
04 Arnold, supra note 61, at 1401. Examples of such exclusive jurisdiction include
matters of bankruptcy, 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1964), and patents and copyrights arising under
any act of Congress. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1964). In these areas, the states are of course
preempted.
63 Arnold, supra note 61, at 1402.
64 34 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 171, 178 (1966).




The possibility of such a campaign is also weakened by the right of
removal given to federal officers66 and by the Supreme Court's power of
ultimate review in these actions.67
There are, however, arguments to the contrary. First, the issues
in these cases are exclusively federal in nature-federal officers acting
under federal authority pursuant to federal law. A federal court pre-
sumably has a special competence and concern in these matters.68
Although state courts do have concurrent jurisdiction of all federal
question suits that Congress has not explicitly reserved to the federal
courts, 69 simple efficiency proscribes the creation of fifty separate cen-
ters of control over the conduct of federal officials.
Second, the desire to avert obstructionism is, after all, a valid rea-
son for barring states from enjoining the acts of federal officers. The
possibility of such obstruction is readily apparent. In Jackson v. Kuhn,70
a suit was brought to enjoin the Army from policing the schools of
Little Rock, Arkansas, during the integration crisis, but the complaint
was dismissed for failure to allege the jurisdictional amount. As Pro-
fessor Wechsler expressed the problem, "the danger of hostility within
the states to [a] particular federal affirmation" is an argument in favor
of allowing these cases in federal court regardless of jurisdictional
amount.71
Both the power of federal officers to remove state court suits against
them and the ultimate appellate review by the Supreme Court may
theoretically prevent obstruction.7 2 But these protections may not be
fully effective.
An unsympathetic state court may impede the assertion of a federal
right by delay. One case, in which a federal defense was raised
against a state law claim, was finally decided by the United States
Supreme Court on the merits... after eight years of litigation and
three previous decisions of the Supreme Court.78
While all state courts might not be so inclined to interfere with the
66 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (1964).
67 See Arnold, supra note 61, at 1402.
68 ALl STUDY OF THE DIvisION OF JURISDICION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS
60-68, 69 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1967) [hereinafter cited as ALI Draft No. 5].
69 See In re Green River Drainage Area, 147 F. Supp. 127, 134 (D. Utah 1956);
Cullison, supra note 51, at 240.
70 254 F.2d 555 (8th Cir. 1958).
71 Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 18 LAw &
CONTEMNP. PRoB. 216, 225 (1948).
72 See p. 927 & notes 66-67 supra.




activities of federal officers, still it might be far better to prevent this
possibility by at least depriving state courts of the opportunity to make
use of the injunction, rather than relying on remedies such as removal
that might afford little relief to an obstruction campaign.
Nor is it persuasive to argue that monetary damages are potentially
as obstructive as the proposed injunctive relief. In suits for money
damages, the act complained of has already been committed, and the
only question is whether to reimburse the plaintiff for his alleged losses.
Injunctive relief, however, could delay an essential undertaking. Yet,
if state court injunctive relief is unavailable, plaintiffs such as Wolff
and Shortt, who have clearly been deprived of a federal right and hence
have a legitimate claim, may have no remedy.
IV
STATUTORY CHANGE
A. A Statute of General Jurisdiction
Statutory change to eliminate the jurisdictional amount require-
ment appears to be the most feasible means of affording protection to
plaintiffs such as Wolff and Shortt who are deprived of a constitutional
right through the actions of federal officers. Yet, despite the apparently
favorable attitude of Congress toward civil rights suits,74 it has not seen
fit to remove the matter in controversy requirement in the federal
officer situation. Commentators have none the less urged that the re-
quirement be dropped for cases that otherwise qualify for federal ques-
tion jurisdiction under section 1331.71 Most notably, the American Law
Institute, in its Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State
and Federal Courts,76 has proposed a substitute for section 1331 in
which no jurisdictional amount would be required for federal question
74 One possible indication of this attitude might be gleaned from S. REP. No. 1830,
85th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1958). While the report states that the purpose of the jurisdic-
tional amount requirement is to exclude petty claims, it also indicates that Congress has
provided many exceptions that permit federal courts to hear claims regardless of the
amount in controversy. Included among the exceptions is "civil rights," an obvious
reference to 28 U.S.C. § 1343. Section 1343 applies only to deprivations under color of
state law, see note 14 supra, but by referring generally to "civil rights," the report may
indicate that Congress would consider that suits involving civil rights should be main-
tainable regardless of jurisdictional amount.
75 See Friedenthal, New Limitations on Federal Jurisdiction, 11 STAN. L. REv. 213,
217-18 (1959); Wechsler, supra note 71, at 225-26.
76 ALl Draft No. 5, supra note 68, at 5. Tentative Drafts 3-5 reach the same con-
clusions concerning the matter in controversy requirement.
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cases.77 The comments to the draft note the inappropriateness of re-
quiring a matter in controversy in a federal question case, "since the
effect of such a requirement is to deny a federal forum in cases where
the federal courts have a special expertness and a special interest."78
It is true that a "substantial portion of federal question jurisdiction
does involve 'petty controversies,' in terms of the amount in contro-
versy," but "[w]here the right relied on is federal, the national gov-
ernment should bear the burden of providing a forum to parties who
wish to be heard in federal court."7 It is also argued that the jurisdic-
tional amount requirement may be an insult to the state courts:
Congress has the power to require state courts to hear federal
question cases, but to exercise that power in such fashion as to force
small claims into state courts, while reserving larger claims for
federal courts, would smack too much of regarding the state courts
as inferior tribunals, rather than a coordinate system.80
The comments point out that the various exceptions to section 1331,
which often permit "petty" suits in the federal courts, express Congres-
sional recognition of the propriety of providing a federal forum for
federal claims.
Finally, the comments state:
There are apparently a few other instances, besides those men-
tioned at the time of the 1958 amendment, in which no special
statute is applicable and thus the requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1331
as to amount in controversy must be satisfied.... But it is clear that
the amount requirement of § 1331 is largely illusory, and that it
has no significant impact on the workload of the federal courts.8 '
77 ALl Draft No. 5, supra note 68, at 5. The proposed § 1311(a) states:
Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, the district courts shall
have original jurisdiction without regard to amount in controversy of all civil
actions in which the initial pleading, whether for coercive relief or for a declara-
tory judgment, sets forth a substantial claim arising under the Constitution, laws,
or treaties of the United States.
Concerning the other changes made by the section, most notably the additions to the
"arises under" clause of 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1964), the draft states:
This subsection is intended to be declaratory of existing doctrine as to when a case
is within the original federal question jurisdiction, while using somewhat
different language than does the present statute in order to emphasize that the
statutory grant is not coextensive with that of the Constitution.
ALl Draft No. 5, supra note 68, at 72. Cases such as Wolff, which do raise a bona fide
first amendent issue, pose no problems in this regard.
78 ALl STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWIEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS
49 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1966).
79 Id. at 49-50.
80 Id. at 50.
81 Id. at 202.
[Vol. 53:916
DRAFT RECLASSIPICATION
The future of the ALI proposal obviously hinges upon Congress's
estimate of the wisdom of removing the matter in controversy require-
ment, There is some merit in a shift from requiring the jurisdictional
amount in all cases not specifically excepted to requiring it only where
a specific statute so provides. But there may be strong reasons to
retain the requirement, despite the conclusions of the ALI study.
Protection of the federal administrative machinery, laboriously built
up over the past several decades, may be the most important considera-
tion. It is not very difficult to transform an adverse administrative rul-
ing into a claim of deprivation of civil liberties; a flood of such
injunctive suits could easily impair the working of the federal admin-
istrative agencies.
The jurisdictional amount requirement, coupled with the denial
of state injunctive power, thus serves as a partial buffer against ha-
rassing claims. Congress can decide, agency by agency, when judicial
review should be permitted. 2 Failure to provide for judicial review of
the actions of some agency officers may reflect a determination that the
activities of these agencies are too essential and delicate for review.83
Thus, the various "buffers" against judicial review of their actions,
including the jurisdictional amount requirement, have been left intact.
It is true that if a statute were passed extending federal jurisdiction
over all federal question cases regardless of amount in controversy,
some constraints on judicial review would still remain. For example,
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies would enable
courts to turn away claims brought merely to avoid normal agency
channels. The exhaustion concept is flexible enough to protect civil
rights as well as to ensure the orderly procedure of administrative
82 See the examples given in note 24 supra.
83 Certainly this is the case with the Selective Service System. In Falbo v. United
States, 320 U.S. 549 (1944) (later distinguished in Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114
(1946)), the Court stated:
The circumstances under which the Act was adopted lend no support to a view
which would allow litigious interruption of the process of selection which
Congress created.... Congress apparently regarded "a prompt and unhesitating
obedience to orders" issued in that process "indispensable to the complete
attainment of the object" of national defense.
320 U.S. at 554. And the Wolff court itself, though it took a broad view of the power of
the courts to act against the Selective Service, stated:
Irrespective of the existence of the power to do so, the courts, and par-
ticularly this Court, have been extremely reluctant to bring any phase of the
operation of the Selective Service System under judicial scrutiny. The very
nature of the Service demands that it operate with maximum efficiency, unim-
peded by external interference.
Wolff v. Selective Serv. Local Bd, No. 16, 372 F.2d 817, 822 (2d Cir. 1967),
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agencies. 84 In addition, the concepts of ripeness and standing are sim-
ilarly useful. 85
But none of these doctrines is as mechanically efficient as the
jurisdictional amount requirement. The applicability of the other
doctrines, and thus the outcome of possible harassing suits, would de-
pend upon court interpretation. Litigation would have to proceed on
those issues and on the merits of each claim. Jurisdictional amount,
on the other hand, can be determined in a summary proceeding on
motion to dismiss.86 Arguably, then, it might be preferable to continue
the approach of creating exceptions allowing redress against federal
officers on an agency-by-agency basis, rather than to abolish altogether
the efficient jurisdictional amount requirement.
B. Statutes Conferring Limited Jurisdiction
It might be argued, therefore, that any congressional efforts to
remedy the inadequacies of existing protection against actions of fed-
eral officers ought to follow the established pattern of excepting suits
challenging actions of specific agencies from the jurisdictional amount
requirements of section 1331. In this way, the scope of civil rights
protection can be broadened in a moderate and controlled manner.
For example, a statute might be devised to deal with civil rights
claims against the Selective Service, probably by amending the mandate
of finality87 to allow judicial review of board action. Although the
Selective Service performs a vital function that cannot stand extensive
tampering,"" courts have gradually indicated that the exemption of its
administrative structure from judicial review cannot be allowed to
infringe constitutional rights.89 A statute must both protect those rights
and defend the Service from undue interference.
81 Exhaustion will not be required where it serves no purpose. In Wolff, for ex-
ample, both the national appeal board and the National Director had repeatedly stated
that the reclassifications were proper. "When there is nothing to be gained from the
exhaustion of administrative remedies and the harm from the continued existence of the
administrative ruling is great, the courts have not been reluctant to discard this doctrine."
372 F.2d at 825.
85 The basic principle of ripeness is that "[j]udicial machinery should be conserved
for problems which are real and present or imminent, not squandered on problems which
are abstract or hypothetical or remote." 3 K. DAvis, supra note 27, § 21.01, at 116.
Standing has caused greater difficulty, but it has been asserted that "[o]ne who is in fact
adversely affected by governmental action should have standing to challenge that action
if it is judicially reviewable." Id. § 22.18, at 291.
86 See pp. 923-24 & note 40 supra.
87 Military Selective Service Act of 1967, § 10(b)(3), 50 U.S.C.A. Appendix § 460(b)(3)
(Supp. 1967). See note 25 supra.
88 See note 83 supra.
89 The progression from Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549 (1944), which denied
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The great majority of Selective Service determinations do not
involve constitutional rights. In such cases the Service clearly acts
within its authority in determining a registrant's classification, and the
ordinary administrative processes should be able to deal with the prob-
lem sufficiently. Accordingly, Congress might enact a statute that would
subject the Selective Service System to judicial review regardless of
jurisdictional amount, but only in cases where the System exceeds its
jurisdiction and infringes a constitutional right. The arduous case-by-
case testing and harassment that might result under a statute completely
abolishing the jurisdictional amount would thus be avoided. Never-
theless, the proposed statute would protect the civil liberties of regis-
trants with a minimum dislocation of the current system.
The question remains whether the enactment of such a statute is
politically feasible. Obviously, in time of war, the System must be
permitted to operate without undue interference. Nor is there any
indication of congressional sympathy for plaintiffs such as Wolff and
Shortt. But if the protection of civil liberties offers no inducement to
Congress to alter the draft law in this regard, consideration of its posi-
tion in the federal system ought to provoke at least some thought. In a
sense, congressional obstinacy has already cost that body the initiative
in this matter, for it is apparent that the courts are expanding the area
of inquiry into the administrative behavior of the Selective Service. Al-
though the House committee that considered the 1967 draft law stated
that the purpose of amending section 10(b)(3)90 was to enunciate dearly
"the principle already in existing law" 91-the Estep doctrine-the
report did not state that the "existing law" was made by the courts
over twenty years ago, and not by Congress. Congress has thus been
passed by, for reasons of "personal liberties,"92 in its initial attempt to
control the jurisdiction of the federal courts over the Selective Service.
Yet at least one branch of Congress seems content to let this state
of affairs continue. In its report93 on the Military Selective Service Act
of 1967,11 the House Committee on Armed Services spoke ill of courts,
like that in Wolff, that "prematurely inquire into the classification
judicial review of a draft classification, through Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114
(1946), to Wolff v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 16, 372 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1967), illustrates
the trend.
90 Military Selective Service Act of 1967, § 1(8), 50 U.S.C.A. Appendix § 460(b)(8)
(Supp. 1967), amending Universal Military Training and Service Act § 10(b)(8), 50 U.S.C.
Appendix § 460(b)(3) (1964).
91 H.R. REP. No. 267, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 46 (1967).
92 Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 121-22 (1946).
93 H.R. REP. No. 267, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
94 81 Stat. 100 (1967), 50 U..CA. Appendix §§ 451-71 (Supp. 1967).
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action of local boards . . . ,,95 At the same time, the judicial future
appears to be plainly marked out. Courts are beginning to evidence a
belief that the current administrative procedure of the System is in-
adequate to guarantee full protection to all those affected by it.96 The
issue will no longer be settled by urging the courts to respect the sanc-
tity of the Selective Service; constitutional questions have superseded
mere administrative considerations. An attitude of resistance by Con-
gress can only increase the danger that the System's operations will be
disrupted, as aggrieved parties are permitted to litigate their civil rights
through ordinary channels. The courts, as was tacitly done in Wolff,
have indicated that they might be willing to run this risk, if it is essential
to the protection of civil liberties. Yet Congress can regain the initiative
by enacting a statute that overcomes these constitutional objections by
providing for speedy, efficient judicial review of such claims. The courts
should then feel constrained to follow the review statute closely, as they
do in all cases where Congress grants jurisdiction to the inferior federal
courts. 97 But if Congress fails to fill the gap in the statutory structure,
the courts will undoubtedly continue to assume an innovative role in
an effort to prevent administrative abuse, by the Selective Service and
others, of basic constitutional liberties.
Alfred C. Jones, III
95 H.R. REP. No. 267, supra note 91, at 31.
96 But see Breen v. Selective Serv. Local Bd., - F. Supp. - (D. Conn. 1968).
1968).
97 See cases cited note 48 supra.
